Protest is an essential feature of a constitutional democracy. It enables individuals to express dissent, challenge governmental action and bring public attention to grievances. While protests are commonly associated with speeches, demonstrations and written communication, some forms of protest communicate through the human body itself. A hunger strike is one such form, in which an individual deliberately refuses food to convey a grievance, demand governmental action or draw attention to a social or political cause. A hunger strike, however, presents a difficult constitutional dilemma. On one hand, the decision to refuse food implicates bodily autonomy, personal liberty, dignity and freedom of expression. On the other, prolonged fasting may seriously endanger health and life, raising the question whether the State may intervene to protect a protester even against their wishes. The dilemma becomes particularly acute when the hunger striker is in State custody, or when medical intervention becomes necessary. The central question is therefore not simply whether an individual has a right to refuse food. It is whether the Constitution protects the deliberate use of one's body as a means of political or social expression, and, if so, where the State's power to intervene begins. This article argues that a competent individual's hunger strike should ordinarily receive constitutional protection as a form of expressive conduct and bodily autonomy, while recognising that such protection cannot be absolute. Any State intervention must be legally authorised, necessary and proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued.